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A B S T R A C T
Roger Penrose is known for his proposals, in collaboration with Stuart Hameroff, for 
quantum action in the brain. These proposals, which are still recent, have a prior, less 
known basis, which will be studied in the following work. First, the paper situates the 
framework from which a mathematical physicist like Penrose proposes to speak about 
consciousness. Then it shows how he understands the possible relationships between 
computation and consciousness and what criticism from other authors he endorses, to 
conclude by explaining how he understands this relationship between consciousness 
and computation. Then, it focuses on the concept of non-locality so essential to his 
understanding of consciousness. With some examples, such as impossible objects or 
aperiodic tiling, the study addresses the concept of non-locality as Penrose understands 
it, and then shows how far he intends to arrive with that concept of non-locality. At all 
times the approach will be more philosophical than physical.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Speaking of Roger Penrose and 
consciousness immediately refers to Stuart 
Hameroff, with whom he has written multiple 
articles (Hameroff and Penrose 2014a; 
2014b). It is true that Penrose formulated 
its proposals more than two decades ago 
(Penrose 1996) and yet what is not so well 
known is the approach and motivations 
behind it. This paper proposes to travel back 
in time and recover the heuristic motivation 
behind some of Penrose’s most recent 
proposals, bringing to light some interesting 
aspects for the debate on a consciousness 
that resists naturalization (Arana 2015).
In his essays, Roger Penrose makes 
an approximation to the mind-body 
relationship (Herce 2016). From the outset, 
he rejects a dualistic view of mind and body, 
as obeying different types of laws: physical 
on the one hand and free on the other. He 
considers that what controls or describes 
the functioning of the mind must be an 
integral part of what governs the material 
properties of our universe (Penrose 1994, 
213). In this sense, he is a naturalist and 
even a physicalist. However, according 
to Penrose, neither known physics nor 
computational activity would suffice to 
describe the functioning of the mind. There 
must be something else outside known 
physics that is non-computational in nature.
This article will begin by defining 
the different perspectives that Penrose 
observes regarding the possibility of 
artificially creating sentient beings. For this, 
the study will focus in particular on the first 
part of Shadows of the Mind (Penrose 1994), 
where Penrose delves into an argument that 
he had already exposed in The Emperor’s 
New Mind (Penrose 1991).
The deepening of Penrose’s arguments 
follows two paths: a negative critique, 
against those who think that our conscious 
mentality may be, in principle, fully conceived 
in terms of computational models; and 
a positive critique, to find out how and 
where this non-computational activity 
can be expressed. The first route is more 
rigorous than the second one. However, 
this article presents the reasons he argues 
for that positive quest for consciousness 
in the material realm, without focusing 
on the concrete solution, which is highly 
speculative, but extracting the heuristic 
motivations.
II. The framework for Penrose’s stance
When Roger Penrose was asked in an 
interview what led him to cross the frontiers 
of physics and mathematics to investigate 
the phenomenon of consciousness, he 
answered:
It is a point of view that I formulated 
when I was in university in the 1950s. And 
I was fundamentally inspired by Gödel’s 
theorem, which shows that mathematical 
truths cannot be reduced to calculations 
alone, and that to understand the 
mathematical realities we need to go 
beyond, out of mere computer rules. That is, 
no consistent system can be used to prove 
itself. What Gödel does is show how certain 
mathematical truths, that are beyond 
the reach of mathematical norms, can be 
established. So, the way we understand 
those rules allows us to transcend beyond 
the rules themselves. What that tells me 
is that our understanding is outside the 
norm. This is an aspect of the question that 
leads us to the next phase, our brain and 
the ability to think consciously, which is 
what separates us forever from computers: 
The most powerful and perfected of them 
can perform calculations of astonishing 
complexity with dizzying rapidity, but will 
never “understand” what it does. It is the 
result of how physical laws operate, and 
those physical laws have to be outside 
computational activity. Classical physics and 
quantum physics as we understand it today 
could be reduced to computation. So we 
have to go look beyond these two disciplines 
(…) What I speculate is that it is necessary 
to lay the foundations for the theoretical 
revolution that allows physics to include in 
its field the phenomenon of consciousness 
(Alfieri 2007, 126–27).
The above quote, although long, presents 
Penrose’s compression frame for studying 
his proposal in relation to the phenomenon 
of consciousness. This proposal has the 
following starting point: a mathematician 
can understand mathematical issues, which 
are outside the norms that regulate these 
same mathematics. In such a way that 
mathematics cannot justify itself internally, 
but require an external justification. This 
idea connects with Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems and entails a two-level distinction 
between a level of conscious understanding 
of reality and a level that is not self-aware.
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According to Penrose’s position, there 
exists a physical world governed by precise 
laws, physical and mathematical, partly 
unknown. It is a predictable and calculable 
world, which is perhaps deterministic 
and also computable. In addition, there is 
another world related to consciousness. In 
this second one, which is not computable, 
is where some terms like soul, spirit, art or 
religion make sense (Penrose 1999, 82–84).
In turn, consciousness would have two 
areas of manifestation: a passive and an 
active one. The passive field would have 
to do with knowledge in the broad sense, 
and the active realm is associated with 
freedom and will. Penrose uses two terms 
“awareness” and “consciousness” to refer 
to the phenomenon of consciousness and, 
although he does not define them, he tries 
to clarify the terminology. He maintains that 
his position coincides with the common 
intuitive perception of the meaning 
of these concepts. In his scheme: “(a) 
‘intelligence’ requires ‘understanding’ and 
(b) ‘understanding’ requires ‘awareness’”. 
In addition, ‘awareness’ would be the 
passive aspect of the phenomenon of 
‘consciousness’, whereas ‘free will’ would 
be the active aspect (Penrose 1994, 37–40) 
Penrose gives no further explanation, 
partly because he does not consider himself 
capable of philosophical precisions and 
partly because he conforms to common 
sense meanings. For his argument, it is 
enough to consider (1) that in order to 
understand it is necessary to be conscious 
and (2) that consciousness is a non-
computable reality.
III. Four perspectives on the conscience-
computer relationship 
Penrose groups several arguments about 
the relationship between conscious thinking 
and computation in four perspectives:
A. All conscious thinking is 
computation. Just by performing the 
right computations, consciousness will be 
evoked.
B. Consciousness is a characteristic of 
the physical action of the brain. Any physical 
action can be simulated computationally, 
but the simulation itself cannot evoke 
consciousness.
C. Adequate physical action in the brain 
evokes consciousness, but this physical 
activity cannot be properly simulated.
D. Consciousness cannot be explained 
by physics, computation, or any other 
science.
None of these four types of relationships 
between conscious thinking and 
computation would be exclusive. Moreover, 
most authors would adopt more flexible 
positions. But the goal of Penrose is not 
to analyze all the possibilities but the most 
paradigmatic. Therefore, he focuses on 
these four positions, which associates to the 
approaches of four authors: Turing, Searle, 
Penrose, and Gödel respectively. And he 
submits these positions to four criticisms 
he calls: Searle’s argument (against stance 
A), Chalmers’s argument (against stance 
B), Turing’s test or “scientific” argument 
(against stances B and D) and Gödel’s 
argument (against positions A and B).
IV. Three critics to the above-mentioned 
perspectives
A. John Searle’s argument
Perspective A would correspond with 
strong Artificial Intelligence and would 
be defended by Turing. According to this 
position, mental activity is simply the correct 
realization of a sequence of well-defined 
operations, such as those performed by 
any device with a simple algorithm. In this 
way, a well-programmed computer (or its 
programs) could understand language and 
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would have other mental capacities similar 
to human beings, whose abilities imitate. 
According to strong AI, a computer can play 
chess intelligently, make a smart move, or 
understand language. Similarly, the mind 
would have an extremely sophisticated 
algorithm, executed with exquisite subtlety, 
but nothing more. Therefore, any computer 
that possesses such an algorithm would be 
aware.
 However, according to Penrose, 
the process of understanding is much 
richer than an algorithm that gives the 
right answer. Against the strong AI, it is 
directed the famous Searle’s Chinese room 
argument (Searle 1980). This argument 
proposes a mental experiment by reduction 
to absurdity, whose central element is a 
human being performing an imaginary 
simulation of what a computer does. 
The human being inside a room follows 
instructions to order and handle Chinese 
symbols, although he does not know their 
meaning, much as a computer follows the 
algorithmic instructions of a program. Thus, 
as long as the human being manipulates the 
Chinese symbols following the instructions, 
it may seem that he understands Chinese, 
but he does not really understand anything. 
All it does is manipulate symbols without 
understanding the syntax or language (Cole 
2015).
Another way of presenting this argument 
is as Penrose does. He presents a room 
that encloses a person without knowledge 
of Chinese but with the grammatical rules 
of the language and a perfect mastery of 
them. Later, this person is asked questions 
in Chinese whose meaning he does not 
understand, but to which he can give an 
adequate answer with the help of the rules. 
In this case, this person could respond well 
but would still not understand what he has 
answered.
Searle used this argument to criticize 
strong AI, while advocating a weak Artificial 
Intelligence, according to which brains 
would be equivalent to thinking machines. 
For Searle all aspects of understanding could 
be simulated, but simulation itself would not 
involve understanding. Therefore, for weak 
AI, computers would be a useful element 
for areas such as psychology or linguistics, 
because they could simulate mental abilities, 
but that would not mean that computers 
were intelligent. 
Against the weak AI defended by Searle, 
Penrose presents a criticism by David 
Chalmers.
B. David Chalmers’ argument
Penrose’s B stance, which approximates 
the classical version of weak AI, holds 
that brain’s actions could be simulated 
computationally. Even so, a similar external 
behavior would not be enough to know 
what the computer understands or feels 
and, therefore, to know if it is conscious, 
because consciousness, according to Searle, 
would be in what it feels and not in how it 
acts. Acting as a conscious subject would 
not be enough to ensure that you are aware. 
Therefore, the presence of consciousness 
would not be objectively discernible.
According to Penrose, this position has 
been criticized by David Chalmers (1996) in 
an argument that is directed only against 
stance B (weak IA) and leaves intact the rest 
of stances. The argument comes from the 
assumption, which Searle would accept, that 
in a human brain each of its neurons could be 
replaced in the future by a chip that works 
exactly the same. If this change were made 
individually, with each new replacement of 
a neuron, the person’s inner experiences 
should remain unchanged. There would not 
be a nth neuron whose replacement would 
cause the loss of consciousness. Therefore, 
Penrose concludes with Chalmers, neither 
stance B is correct.
In summary and once these two 
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criticisms are considered separately, if 
Chalmers’ argument and the Chinese room 
argument are combined, it turns out that 
Artificial Intelligence would be excluded as a 
whole, both in the strong version (stance A) 
and in the weak version (stance B). Artificial 
Intelligence would then be insufficient to 
explain the phenomenon of consciousness. 
Penrose comes to this same conclusion with 
his own argument. An argument known as 
Penrose’s New Argument, perhaps because 
it constitutes a new deepening in the 
arguments Gödel-type that John Lucas had 
developed:
“I believe that our positions are very 
broadly in agreement, although the 
emphasis that I am placing on the role of the 
Gödelian argument may be a little different 
from his [Lucas]” (Penrose 1997, 7). 
Since this paper is more interested 
in Penrose’s proposal than in Penrose’s 
criticism, it does not stop to analyze 
Penrose’s New Argument (Lindström 2001; 
Herce 2014, 138–49), although he pretends 
to be more consistent and complete than the 
arguments by Searle and Chalmers (Penrose 
1997, 9); and continues to expound the last 
of the arguments he poses against stance D.
C. The “scientific” argument
According to stance D - like B - the 
presence of a consciousness could not 
be detected scientifically, because it 
would not have experimentally verifiable 
manifestations. What differentiates the 
position D from the B is that according to 
the first the behavior of a human mind could 
not be simulated computationally, while for 
the second it would be possible to simulate. 
Although that does not mean the presence 
of a consciousness. 
Penrose agrees with Mentalism - as he 
calls position D - in its claim that human 
mind cannot be simulated, but rejects it by 
holding that it is not scientifically possible 
to detect whether a being is conscious or 
not. He argues that consciousness can be 
detected scientifically, similarly to how the 
Turing test works.
This test is a test proposed in 1950 by 
Alan Turing to discover the existence of 
intelligence in a machine (Oppy and Dowe 
2016). From a stance type A (strong IA), he 
assumes that if a machine acts in all respects 
as intelligent then it is intelligent. During 
the Turing test, a researcher in a room asks 
questions to a machine and a human being 
located in different rooms. His aim is to 
discover who the human being is and who 
the machine is, even though both can lie 
to him. Turing’s thesis is that if the player 
and the machine are sufficiently skilled the 
researcher cannot distinguish who is who.
Penrose endorses the Turing test and 
generalizes it to what he calls the “scientific” 
argument. According to his position, it 
would be possible to detect the presence 
of a consciousness by means of scientific 
methods. He argues that the phenomenon 
of consciousness is not alien to scientific 
activity although is difficult to explain 
within the current scientific knowledge. He 
rejects the mentalist position because it is 
not scientifically testable, and because the 
enigma of consciousness already contains 
enough mystery without seeking solutions 
outside of science.
However, Penrose does not realize that 
the argument he uses to reject Mentalism 
can be used against the mathematical 
Platonism he advocates. There is enough 
mystery in the relationship between 
mathematics and physics without adding 
a Platonic mathematical world that is not 
scientifically testable either. In this sense, 
his critique of Mentalism is not consistent 
with his well-known Platonic stance in 
mathematics.
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V. Penrose’s proposal on computation 
and consciousness
As a scientific alternative to Mentalism, 
Penrose holds the position C. According to 
this perspective, computers never effectively 
simulate the conscious behavior of a human 
being. That is, there will always be someone 
during a Turing test who realizes that the 
computer does not understand.
“But viewpoint C, on the other hand, would 
not even admit that a fully effective simulation 
of a conscious person could ever be achieved 
merely by a computer-controlled robot. 
Thus, according to C, the robot’s actual lack 
of consciousness ought ultimately to reveal 
itself, after a sufficiently long interrogation” 
(Penrose 1994, 14–15).
In fact, during the last decades an annual 
competition between computer programs 
that follows the standard established in the 
Turing test has been developing. However, so 
far, no program has managed to win the gold 
medal of the Loebner Prize, which is given 
to the couple (human-computer) that can 
deceive the judge.
Therefore and in other words, according 
to Penrose, (1) no unconscious object could 
be passed as a conscious subject. But (2) 
the presence of a conscious being would be 
scientifically detectable.
In studying the relations between 
consciousness and computability, Penrose 
adopts a posture that he calls C, more 
specifically strong C. According to this 
position, adequate physical action in the 
brains would be able to evoke consciousness. 
However, this action cannot be simulated by 
a computer: “We need a new physics that 
is relevant to brain activity.” (Penrose 1999, 
85) He thus departs from the stance weak C, 
for which the reason for the impossibility of 
such a simulation could be due to the non-
computability of pure random phenomena 
observed in quantum mechanics.
VI. Non-locality of consciousness
Penrose’s arguments on this issue are 
highly speculative. This is his most criticized 
and rejected hypothesis. In addition, it is 
an argument full of explanatory leaps. In 
his last three essays, he has not addressed 
this issue and between his first and second 
book has changed his thesis. However, they 
have an intrinsic heuristic value, especially 
if one simply analyzes the idea behind 
their proposal and not so much where the 
“conscious action” takes place1.
For a compression of the scheme and 
as a background, it is necessary to resort 
to the concept of non-locality given in the 
aperiodic tiling problem and in Penrose’s 
impossible objects, two key elements of 
his work (Herce 2014, 25–30). According 
to this concept there may be a level of 
determination that is above the local level. 
That is, what locally seems indeterminate, 
from a higher level could be determined, 
such as in the Penrose’s triangle or staircase. 
These objects, seen partially (locally) are 
possible, but seen together (non-locally) are 
impossible.
Similarly, in the aperiodic tiling problem, 
1 Penrose associates the phenomenon of 
consciousness with a coordinated action on a large 
number of brain neurons that would be caused by the 
orchestrated reduction of the state vector (Orch OR) in 
the neural microtubules. Since microtubules are found 
in many structures of living things, Penrose goes on to 
argue that even the paramecia would perform some 
conscious activity, because they have a cytoskeleton 
formed by microtubules. Depending on the complexity 
of the structures and the amount of microtubules 
involved in each orchestrated reduction, there would 
be degrees of consciousness, higher in mammals, and 
very special in the case of human beings. Thus, for 
Penrose consciousness emerges from the material 
and he points to microtubules as structures in which 
the conditions of possibility of conscious actions could 
be given due to the effects of quantum gravity during 
the collapse of the wave function. As it has been said: 
highly speculative.
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when one wants to cover a surface non-
periodically with a finite number of tiles, 
no pattern of repetition is found. However, 
from a non-local level that type of tiling 
can be found; and, in fact, following a very 
simple scheme with only two types of tiles, 
it has a deterministic and non-computable 
evolution. Robert Berger showed that 
the evolution of this scheme cannot be 
simulated by any computer, because there is 
no algorithm capable of deciding whether a 
finite set of tiles will cover a surface (Berger 
1966). This scheme is then governed by non-
local rules that are beyond computation.
Therefore, according to the Penrose 
scheme there are two levels: a non-
computable upper level that influences 
the lower level. In analogy to how the 
aperiodicity of the aperiodic tiling (from 
the upper level) influences the lower level, 
without being locally detectable.
At the local level, everything might 
seem determined and computable. 
Only when viewed from a higher level 
does the noncomputability appear. So 
also, understanding, knowledge and 
consciousness would be given at a higher 
level that is not computable.
These considerations of Penrose give 
rise to consider that there could be types 
of higher order non-computability (Penrose 
1999, 100) involved, for example, in the way 
the universe evolves or in human freedom. 
He defends thus the existence of several 
levels, not only of two, each of which could 
have the characteristics of a “determinism 
not computable” with respect to the 
superior level.
From here, a couple of points for 
further research should be highlighted. 
The first is the recursive aspect of many 
physical phenomena and their possible 
relation to consciousness, as some authors 
have explored (Hofstadter 2013). And the 
second is the deduced conclusion that 
consciousness is situated on a higher level 
than the physical, although it could emerge 
from it. Penrose, does not attempt to 
include consciousness on the same level 
of physical or mathematical causes, nor to 
separate it completely from them. He thus 
leaves the way open to a consciousness that 
interacts with physical levels, although the 
way in which that relationship takes place 
remains the greatest mystery.
Conclusions
This work has started by pointing 
out the different positions that Penrose 
distinguishes in relation to whether or not 
the consciousness is computable. From 
there, it has shown the criticisms made by 
Penrose and with what position he stays. 
Having defined his position as strong 
C, the paper has explored what such a 
position consists of and how Penrose’s 
comprehension of consciousness revolves 
around the concept of non-locality, which 
has also been explained. From this last 
idea and taking one more step, this paper 
concludes saying the following. 
From a local point of view, Penrose 
points out the existence of determinate 
and computable realities that coexist with 
others that seem indeterminate, because in 
them occur decisions or novelties that are 
not computable. However, the decision or 
novelty that appears on a certain level could 
be determined by some law of a higher level.
Such a law would, for example, be 
responsible for preventing Penrose 
stairs from actually existing, albeit locally 
seemingly possible, or allowing aperiodic 
quasi-crystals to be actual physical 
configurations, although they do not 
have a local pattern that structures them. 
Therefore, Penrose deduces, that at the 
local level everything would be determined 
but not everything would be computable. 
The apparent indeterminacy of the non-
computable realities would be determined 
o n  t h e  D i a l o g u e  b e t we e n  S c i e n c e  a n d  T h e o l o g y
DIALOGO  3:2 (2017) 
CONFERENCES & JOURNAL
doi: 10.18638/dialogo.2017.3.2.11
- 133 - Session 3. CONSCIOUSNESS
from the upper or global level. In short, the 
non-computability manifests locally, but 
refers to a non-local element.
A further step, given by Penrose, is to 
admit the possibility that there are several 
levels of determination. Thus, on the higher 
level you could find both the law that 
governs the universe and the consciousness 
that acts freely. From these two levels of 
universal law and personal liberty, events at 
lower levels would be determined.
This position of Penrose tries to maintain 
an equilibrium, which hardly prevents to 
end in one of the two previously rejected 
ends: either a materialism where freedom 
is only apparent, because everything is 
determined by a higher law, or a scientifically 
indemonstrable mentalist dualism that gives 
room for freedom. It is not clear where it 
ends.
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